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As Israel and Hamas are finalizing the details of a temporary ceasefire, the long-term fate of Gaza remains undetermined. Although the mechanisms for stabilizing and rebuilding Gaza will only be officially discussed during the second phase of the ceasefire, options such as a complete restoration of Palestinian Authority control have already been proposed.
Each of the options presented has major flaws, such as the wild unpopularity of the PA and its inability to exert control over the territories it now has, that will make it unlikely these options would bring the long-term security, development, and quiet both Israelis and Palestinians so sorely need. One option stands out from among the rest for its ability to address the difficult challenges that a post-war Gaza presents. While it is not without challenges, sending a strong multinational force to Gaza may provide a path toward stability and reconstruction.
Israel and much of the international community have been skeptical about the possibility of a multinational force in Gaza, and with good reason. The history of the region is littered with such forces struggling to live up to their promise. The most recent example is the failure of the United Nations force in Lebanon, UNIFIL, to fulfil its mandate and prevent Hezbollah from establishing major military strongholds along the Israeli-Lebanese border between 2006 and October 2023.
The success or failure of any future multinational force in Gaza will hinge on the mission's ability to deliver and guarantee security. The current ceasefire arrangements leave room for Hamas to try to retake control of Gaza. If the multinational force cannot prevent Hamas from again threatening the communities of southern Israel, then the inexorable countdown until the next war in Gaza will have already begun. Based on its experiences with Lebanon and elsewhere, Israel will not agree to a multinational force entering Gaza if it perceives the force as weak and unable to secure Israeli security. The experience of the Israeli-Lebanese border is a cause for concern, but the UN force in Lebanon is not the only model for a multinational force. There are better models out there and, by learning lessons from both the successes and failures of previous multinational forces, the force deployed to Gaza can achieve far better outcomes.
The force in Lebanon operates under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which restricts its use of force to little more than self-defense, constraining its ability to fulfill its mandate. Conversely, in Kosovo and East Timor, UN authorized multinational forces conducted their missions under Chapter VII, giving them a more robust ability to employ force in the conduct of their mission. Both have been far more successful than the UN mission in Lebanon. Additionally, the forces in East Timor and Kosovo were larger and more robust in their capabilities. In East Timor, this allowed the multinational force to face off against guerilla bands and Indonesian forces, and to begin restoring order after an almost complete collapse of state services. The multinational force in Kosovo ensured Serbian forces' withdrawal and demilitarized the Kosovo Liberation Army—while also providing security and public safety, supporting humanitarian assistance and refugee return, and coordinating with the UN's governance mission.
Another lesson from past missions is that it will not be enough to simply put forces in Gaza to keep the peace. The force must have local and international legitimacy and undertake three distinct missions, ideally under a singular coordinating authority. This will avoid key pitfalls of past missions. The multinational force should receive its mandate from the UN for maximum international legitimacy. If a Security Council resolution cannot be reached because of tensions between its permanent members, the multinational force could receive its mandate from a coalition of relevant states and actors.
After 15 months of war, Gaza is in dire need of reconstruction which will begin during the third phase of the ceasefire. The multinational force will play a key role in initial reconstruction efforts by ensuring basic humanitarian needs, repairing critical infrastructure, minimizing the hazards caused by threats like unexploded ordnance, and overseeing and coordinating international development efforts. These efforts will increase the local legitimacy of the multinational force while saving civilian lives. The force can also make sure that the aid flowing in gets to the right places without being diverted by militant and criminal organizations.
Finally, as demonstrated in the cases of Kosovo and East Timor, the multinational force must also prevent a vacuum in governance in Gaza. Part of its mission should be to ensure that fundamental civil authorities and essential services are restored and function free of Hamas control. The security, reconstruction, and governance missions should have phased approaches wherein international responsibility and oversight can eventually pass to the PA once it has been revitalized and can prove its ability to manage these tasks. Taken together, conducting these three tasks will allow a variety of countries to make contributions in the areas that most suit their capabilities. The mission will build security for the Israelis and finally allow Gaza to be governed and rebuilt in a way that ensures long-term stability.
If the international community fails to rise to the occasion, the future of Gaza will be bleak, and violence between Israelis and Palestinians are likely to return. If the multinational force is given insufficient authorities and capabilities to guarantee security while building governance and undertaking reconstruction, then Israeli and Palestinian faith in the international community will fade even more.
Despite the many difficulties the mission will undoubtedly face, a multinational force stands as one of the only viable interim solutions for Gaza. It has the potential not only to bring an end to the current violence, which started with Hamas's attack on Oct. 7, 2023, but also to drive forward the two-state solution. Should the multinational force succeed and transfer governance to the PA, it could create momentum for solutions to the more complex geography of the West Bank.
Dr. Jacob Stoil is the Chair of Applied History at West Point Modern War Institute, Senior Fellow of 40th ID Urban Warfare Center, and Trustee of the US Commission on Military History. He can be found on X at @JacobStoil
Dr. Mary Elizabeth Walters is Director of Military Theory and Assistant Professor of Military and Security Studies at the Air Command and Staff College, and Trustee for the Society for Military History.
Dr. Nir Arielli is a Professor of International History at the University of Leeds. He specializes in the modern history of the Middle East. His most recent book, The Dead Sea: A 10,000 Year History, was recently published with Yale University Press.
The views expressed in this article represent the personal views of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the United State Air Force, Army University, Air University, or the U.S. Military Academy.
