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On June 10, the United Nations Security Council managed to do something it hadn't been able to do over the last eight months: pass a resolution demanding a comprehensive ceasefire that would end the war in Gaza. Previous attempts to jam a ceasefire resolution through the chamber were stymied by the United States, which claimed that any action by the U.N. would complicate its own diplomatic initiative with Qatar and Egypt to bring the war to a close and release the remaining hostages.
In the end, the Security Council chose to piggyback off President Joe Biden's three-stage ceasefire proposal. The first stage envisions "an immediate, full, and complete ceasefire" for six weeks, the release of hostages, a massive increase in humanitarian aid into Gaza, an Israeli military pullback from populated areas of the enclave, and the return of displaced Palestinians to their homes. The ceasefire would stay in effect as long as Israel and Hamas continued negotiating on an agreement for phase two, which includes a permanent end to the war. The last stage would begin the long, expensive process of reconstructing Gaza after it was essentially razed to the ground.
It's increasingly clear that Biden, a man who proudly calls himself a Zionist, and who traveled to Israel immediately after Hamas' Oct. 7 attack to show his overriding support, wants the war to end. The conflict has long since turned into a political liability for him, splitting the Democratic Party and causing younger, more progressive voters to denounce the administration's policies. But nobody wants the war to end more than the two and a half million people in Gaza. One only has to take a glance at the numbers to see why: 85 percent of Gaza's population has been displaced, multiple times; 37,000 people have been killed; and the physical destruction has been so extensive that U.N. officials estimate it could take as much as $50 billion to rebuild.
At first glance, this week's news is a glimmer of optimism. Hamas said it supported the Security Council's resolution and will use it as a basis for further indirect negotiations with Israel. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who is on his eight trip to the Middle East, told reporters on June 11 that since Israel accepts Biden's ceasefire plan, the onus is on Hamas' shoulders to accept it as well.
But nobody should pop the champagne yet. We have been here before, most recently last month, when a ceasefire was supposedly imminent only to fall apart over conflicting interpretations of the end state, confusion over which draft agreement was on the table. and the incompetence of Egyptian mediators. Blinken's kernel of positivity is a mystery.
First, notwithstanding Blinken's assurances that Israel is fully on board with the ceasefire proposal, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hasn't explicitly expressed his support in public. In fact, less than 24 hours after Biden presented his plan during a speech at the White House, Netanyahu undermined it by reiterating that under no circumstances would Israel end the war until it achieved its military and political objectives. Those objectives not only include the release of the remaining hostages in Hamas captivity but also the destruction of the terrorist group's military and governing capabilities. That was on May 31. Nothing that Netanyahu has said or done since then should lead anyone to believe he has changed his position on these matters. If anything, Netanyahu's political room for maneuver on this question has shrunk even further now that former generals Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, the only relatively moderate figures in Israel's war cabinet, bolted from the coalition government last weekend.
Second, while it's true that Hamas welcomed the Security Council resolution, this isn't new. We knew long ago that Hamas was perfectly fine negotiating with Israel indirectly if it resulted in a permanent end to the eight month-long war. What Blinken termed "a hopeful sign" from Hamas is really just repetition from the group about its core demand: Israel stops the war and withdraws from Gaza, full-stop.
Third, nothing in the last few days leads me to believe that Israel or Hamas are interested in moving away from their maximalist positions. In fact, those positions are beyond maximalist—they're irreconcilable. Remove the diplomatic jargon and what you get are two sets of contradictory demands. Hamas wants to survive, live to fight another day and over time reconsolidate its dominance in Gaza; Israel wants to put Hamas into the dustbin of history. Squaring these two end-games is impossible, which is the main reason why every negotiation between the two sides since last November's one-week ceasefire-for-hostage agreement has fallen apart. Movement in the diplomatic sphere likely won't happen until at least one side ditches maximalism. But is this possible? Israel and Hamas can compromise over prisoner exchanges, durations of short-term ceasefires, and how many aid trucks can get into Gaza, but they are unable to compromise over existential questions. The stakes for both are simply too high. As long as this continues, the war will go on, possibly until the end of the year as Israeli National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi suggested last month.
In the end, one can only hope this pessimistic assessment turns out to be wrong. The evidence for that at the present time is very slim regardless of what U.S. officials tell us.
Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
