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On Thursday, President Donald Trump announced, once again, his desire for "denuclearization" among countries. Who can argue against wanting to get rid of mankind's most destructive weapon? While we will never completely get rid of nuclear weapons, we have a chance to conduct arms control negotiations with our adversaries. There's just one problem: it can't be done—at least not with America's current strategic goals. If the Trump administration doesn't reevaluate America's geopolitical goals, it will set back the prospects for nuclear arms control for years to come.
China has already rejected Trump's offer to reduce nuclear weapons. No surprise there. China is building up its nuclear arsenal to ensure that it has survivable nuclear weapons should war break out against the United States, in particular over Taiwan. To have any chance at getting China to the negotiating table on this issue, the Trump administration should reconsider America's implicit commitment to come to the defense of Taiwan should China invade.
China continues to improve its anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities—weapons systems that prevent the United States from placing military personnel near Taiwan. These sorts of weapons can destroy many of America's ships and aircraft near and around Taiwan, making it unrealistic for the United States to send ships and aircraft near the island in the first place. China will be tempted to invade knowing that it can limit the number of U.S. conventional forces able to protect the island. Such a failure of deterrence will only place American troops around Taiwan in unnecessary danger.
The good news is that if China can improve its A2/AD capabilities, so can the United States and its allies. The United States should focus on increasing the A2/AD capabilities of its East Asian allies, such as Japan and South Korea, and should send asymmetric weapons to Taiwan. These A2/AD weapons will prevent China from projecting its naval and air power among other East Asian countries. Asymmetric weapons would give Taiwan the means to counter China's aircraft and naval capabilities should they attempt to invade—a so-called porcupine strategy. Doing so would increase the chances of deterring China from invading the island without direct U.S. involvement.
By taking these actions, the United States can create a defensive strategy that increases the chances of keeping China out of Taiwan without escalating to a great-power war. This would open up an opportunity for the United States and China to halt their race for more nuclear weapons.
The Trump administration should also look to lessen tensions with Russia. This doesn't mean appeasing every Russian interest, nor does it call for labeling Volodymyr Zelensky a dictator. Ukraine may not be a beacon of democracy, but today's Russian government is the definition of an autocratic regime. Thankfully, Russia is weak. Its army relied on sheer numbers to wear out the enemy for the grand prize of taking only one-fifth of Ukrainian territory. Its economy boasts about one-tenth of the GDP of NATO's European members. These facts hardly make today's Russian army a successor to history's military juggernauts.
What Russia does have is nuclear weapons—lots of them. Russia can use these weapons as an ace of spades if it feels its existence is threatened. The less conventional military strength a country has, the more tempted it is to reach for its nuclear weapons to defend itself. The fact of the matter is that every war has multiple causes. The Russo-Ukraine War is no exception. In contrast to the simplistic popular debate on whether Russia or NATO started it, the answer is both. NATO expansion since the end of the Cold War set the scene for hostilities between Russia and the West, and Russia attempted to conquer Ukraine to achieve its imperialist aims.
To deter Russia and keep it from using nuclear weapons, Europe must provide for its conventional defense, and NATO must stop its eastward expansion. Implementing these twin policies will prevent the chances of Russia launching another preventive military attack against other Eastern European nations. Europe providing for its own defense will establish a sustainable deterrent against Russia without relying on having U.S. boots on the ground. This European defense, however, must include Ukraine building weapons and purchasing them from Europe and the United States. With no international policeman to protect countries, Ukraine has no choice but to arm itself to defend against future Russian aggression. In the grim world of international politics, only guns and shedding blood hamper the ambitions of nations.
Finally, if the Trump administration wants to have any successful arms control talks, it must reduce tensions with Iran. This means demonstrating to Iran that the United States is not beholden to all of Israel's national interests. It's no secret that Iran is building nuclear capabilities to protect itself in a bad neighborhood. Sending more weapons and security guarantees to Israel emboldens Israel to attack Iran—something that Benjamin Netanyahu has been longing for since his early days as Israel's prime minister. Americans don't want war with Iran. Just as the United States now refuses to follow every Ukrainian interest, it must refuse any actions and interests of Israel's that contradict its and the American people's interests. Doing so lessens the existential pressures on Tehran to build the bomb and creates room to negotiate arms control.
No one wants to live in a world where nuclear Armageddon can happen. But simply wishing away nuclear missiles will get us nowhere. Politics drives war. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate weapon in war. To prevent war, deal with the underlying politics.
Benjamin D. Giltner is a DC-based defense and foreign policy analyst. He earned a Master's of International Affairs from the George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. His research interests and expertise include nuclear weapons, military history and strategy, deterrence, and great-power competition.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
