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Skeptics of America's activities in NATO, whether they want to refocus on Asia or simply want resources and troops to return home, are increasingly optimistic that a future president, be it Donald Trump or someone else, will grant their wishes. With Trump's campaign statements casting doubts on America's Cold War-era commitments, and the American public steadily becoming more skeptical of the military organization, they have good reason to be.
But should Trump, or another NATO-skeptical president, take control of the White House, talk will not be enough. The new administration should act as if they are on a four-year timer. To properly right-size America's presence in Europe, three steps should be undertaken.
The first should be dedication to the cause. Former President Donald Trump's administration was the first to seriously attempt to shift America away from Europe. But his initiative was stymied by timing; until certain individuals left the administration, no effort could truly have been undertaken in earnest. And even once the administration was staffed with those dedicated to the work, starting with only one or two years left in the term simply was not going to be successful. To undo decades of misguided policy, the next administration must start the process immediately with executive orders. One such example could resume Trump's 2020-era plan of moving one-third of American troops out of Germany.
Everyone hired to work on these issues should be in lockstep with the desire to disengage militarily from Europe.
This would be a fundamental re-thinking of American foreign policy and should play a central role in all foreign policy-decision-making. To beat the four-year clock, the administration's goal of disengaging should be re-stated over and over by all public-facing members of the admin and echoed by domestic allies. To highlight the shift, the new president should, along with new executive orders, issue a presidential proclamation declaring America's intention to disengage militarily from Europe with the intent of remaining friends and close allies.
This last point is important for the second step: getting Europe to take America seriously. Former President Barack Obama kindly asked Europe to do more. It kindly declined. Trump demanded it, but the rhetoric was bolder than the action. Europe waited him out, hoping they would not have to deal with a second term. President Joe Biden has adopted Obama's tactics to mixed results (though NATO members have increased defense spending, many "increases" are promises to spend more or incorporate Ukraine aid).
The correct course is somewhere in the middle: polite, but firm. European leaders, chronically unable to see the writing on the wall, will at first assume a bluff is in the cards. Things like a definitive presidential proclamation will do well to dissuade them.
While being firm—the administration must be clear that only real increases in defense spending will cut ice—America should also encourage. One error made by the Trump administration was to push back on French President Emmanuel Macron's desire to pursue a European army; early on, it should be made clear that no such opposition exists. Offers of help to get started could be made, but it should be clear that Europeans will be tasked with the defense of their continent. Europe has a long history of warfighting, over 400 million people, and nuclear weapons. There is no excuse for their present weakness.
European leaders, realizing that the gravy train will end, will resist the above. America's ambassadors to key NATO countries—who should be hired based on expertise and ability to convey messaging, not on campaign donations—should therefore be deputized to make these arguments to their host country's publics.
Finally, the third step requires locking these changes in, as a future president could in theory undo them all. While feasibly anything can be undone in democracy, there are ways to future-proof these moves.
All the aforementioned changes should be pursued via legislation when at all possible. Legislation could be symbolic—the administration could pursue a congressional resolution, for example, in tandem with the presidential declaration—but it could also carry real legal weight. Laws like the one Congress passed in 2020 freezing America's troop levels in Germany, or 2023's bill banning the president from unilaterally withdrawing from NATO, should be taken off the books and vigorously resisted, via veto if necessary, by a future president.
Finally, to ensure that these changes are locked in, the administration should go straight to the source: the North Atlantic Treaty itself. Some say changes are impossible; but NAFTA was supposed to be impossible to change, and Trump managed to do it. Updates could include new membership being restricted to those who spent a certain percentage of GDP on defense and on greater burden-sharing.
These moves would be significant in and of themselves, even if success varies. After all, American interventionists treat the North Atlantic Treaty, a military alliance designed for the Cold War, like a sacred text. Making clear that it can be challenged, or even changed, would remind them that it is far from holy.
Anthony J. Constantini is a contributing fellow at Defense Priorities.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
