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Despite Ukraine's stunning successes on the battlefield, it was to be expected that by the 10th month of the war there would be calls for offering the Kremlin some way out of the conflict it started. Proponents of an off-ramp for Russia have cited the need to avoid further escalation—including the risk that the conflict could spill beyond Ukraine's borders into NATO territory. The destruction of Ukraine, the traumatizing of its people, and the toll on Europe's economy, have also been used as arguments for giving the Kremlin a means of saving face.
However, calls for creating an off-ramp are harmful to Ukraine's fight against its invaders and—importantly—completely unnecessary: The Russian propaganda machine responsible for propagating the invasion's false justifications is fully capable of creating an off-ramp for itself whenever it deems it necessary. The issue policymakers must focus on instead is how to convince Russia to abandon its war aims, which still include seizing Kyiv and annexing large swaths of Ukraine.
The Kremlin's near monopoly of the domestic information space allows it to convincingly portray any outcome in Ukraine as a victory to its domestic audience. Fabricated claims of U.S. biological weapons facilities in Ukraine and plans by Poland to occupy the country—among many other ludicrous assertions—are regularly disseminated across the Russian media landscape and cited by everyday Russians as reasons for waging the war. Were Russian President Vladimir Putin to decide to end the conflict, he could convince his domestic audience that Russia was victorious regardless of the reality on the ground.
For instance, aided by the Ministry of Defense and state media outlets, he could falsely spin the unlawful forced deportations of thousands of Ukrainians from Kherson and elsewhere as a profound military success. Territorial annexation to save the Russian people in the Donbas—one of the original justifications for the war—would no longer be necessary because the Russian army was able to "return its people" to their homeland.
Likewise, the Kremlin could choose to announce that Russia had secured ironclad guarantees from Kyiv and its Western backers that the rights of Russian speakers in the Donbas—which were never in any real danger—would be respected. Again, the narrative of this off-ramp would not be based on any actual negotiations or agreements, but it would create a justification credible enough for Russia to begin selling its domestic audience on the idea of drawing down the war effort. Ultimately, there are a myriad of other stories such as these that the Kremlin could tell its people. It is not the responsibility of Ukraine's allies to provide the off-ramp scenario.
Crucially, if the Kremlin sought to cut its losses, abandon its imperialist objectives, and seek an off-ramp, it could create a new narrative cover for its withdrawal using markedly less resources than it is using to wage war now. War fatigue and low morale among Russia's troops suggest that this would not be a hard sell for the general public. While there would likely be opposition from Russia's militant and ultranationalist far-right, the Kremlin could use its vast repressive measures—typically used against anti-war dissidents—to silence these pro-war critics.
The unfortunate reality is that there has yet to be any indication that decisionmakers in the Russian government are willing to take this approach or seek an off-ramp in some other form. However, there is precedent for a creative and false justification that would permit Russian troops to leave.
In 1989, after nearly a decade of unsuccessful counterinsurgency warfare and nation-building in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov, commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, declared that Soviet troops had left the country because they "totally fulfilled [their] internationalist duty" to support Afghanistan's communists. At this time, the Soviet Defense Ministry also told the U.N. Mission to Afghanistan that instead of occupying Afghanistan to pursue "selfish goals," the USSR was merely trying to defend Afghanistan's "sovereignty and territorial integrity."
Gromov and the Defense Ministry's claims—repeated by Soviet leaders and state news outlets—fully avoided the real reason for the Soviet withdrawal, opting instead for fanciful narratives of humanitarian concern and respect for international law. Notably, in the 1980s the U.S. and its allies did not offer the USSR an off-ramp. Instead, they supported the domestic Afghan opposition with arms and financial assistance until the Soviet Union was forced to reconsider its presence in the country.
If Ukraine's allies want Russia to end the war, rather than advocating for off-ramps, they should bolster their support to Ukraine. A stronger Ukraine will eventually cause Russia to reconsider its war aims.
Artur Kalandarov is a senior associate at The Cohen Group, a strategic business advisory firm based in Washington, DC, where he advises clients on business operations in Eastern Europe. He has previously been published in The National Interest, The Defense Post, Small Wars Journal, and several academic publications.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
