🎙️ Voice is AI-generated. Inconsistencies may occur.
Starting Tuesday, the grand halls of Washington are hosting a gathering of NATO leaders, marking the 75th anniversary of the most consequential military alliance in modern history. Yet, its celebratory mood may be overshadowed by a stark reality: NATO is a shadow of its Cold War self. The war in Ukraine, while presenting an opportunity for some sort of NATO renewal in terms of purpose, capabilities, and even membership with the inclusion of Finland and Sweden, has also highlighted the limitations of the alliance. Today, as NATO gathers in Washington, a profound question hangs heavy in the air: can this relic of a bipolar world adapt to the fractured geopolitics of the 21st century, or will it crumble, a monument to a bygone era?
European critics point a finger at NATO's excessive dependence on American muscle. This imbalance is a direct result of Europe's anemic investment in the alliance, which has left the U.S. to shoulder the lion's share of the responsibility. Following the Soviet Union's demise, NATO's prime antagonist vanished. The brutal Balkan Wars of the 1990s laid bare a clear difference between American decisiveness and European hesitation. The U.S. led the charge in forming a powerful NATO intervention force. Between its troop deployments, air power, and logistical support, the U.S. made the dominant contribution to the operation in the Balkans, a region strategically important to European stability. While European allies participated, their contributions were significantly smaller.
The 2011 intervention in Libya is another striking example of NATO's reliance on U.S. military might. Its initial aim was to enforce a no-fly zone and protect civilians during the Libyan civil war. However, the operation, which was intended to showcase European military leadership, quickly revealed significant gaps in Europe's defense capabilities. The U.S. had to step in to provide critical assets, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as aerial refueling. Even when the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, and despite initial interest in remaining, many NATO allies lacked the logistical backbone, airpower, and infrastructure to maintain operations independently.
During the Cold War, average defense spending across European countries dipped significantly, falling from over 3 percent of GDP to a mere 1.5 percent by 2022. However, the recent resurgence of the Russian threat hasn't jolted Europe awake. European anxieties that the U.S. focus on defense spending is just a product of Washington's partisan politics are misguided. Regardless of who sits in the Oval Office, China will remain a top U.S. national security concern. As Washington prioritizes China in its global strategy, European nations must confront a critical reality: boosting defense spending and taking a more active role in their own security is no longer optional; it's essential.
Europe's shortcomings within NATO are undeniable and require scrutiny. However, the U.S. can't absolve itself of its responsibility to the alliance. Washington's ambitious vision for a global, one-size-fits-all NATO that treats Europe and the Indo-Pacific as a single theater raises serious concerns. For one thing, it risks diverting focus from core European security issues. It also exacerbates existing divisions among transatlantic allies. There's no consensus on how best to handle China, let alone a potential Taiwan contingency. Moreover, European capabilities are insufficient to contribute meaningfully to a U.S.-led defense of Taiwan in a conflict scenario.
Any effort to expand NATO into a global collective security system faces significant obstacles. During the Cold War, a more unified NATO, bound by shared social, cultural, economic, and demographic factors, thrived against a clear and singular threat: the Soviet Union. However, as the alliance has grown and the global order transformed, seeking to make NATO a global collective security system risks undermining its core mission.
While its core mission of collective defense remains unchanged, the alliance itself has undergone a dramatic transformation since its inception. Originally a group of 12 nations, it has ballooned to 32 members through nine rounds of expansion, notably incorporating former Warsaw Pact countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania.
This growth has exposed a critical flaw in NATO's decision-making process: the requirement of unanimous consent. The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which established NATO, requires unanimous consent for new members and all major decisions. Because of this stipulation, a single member can stall action, even during a potential attack. This outdated principle, originally designed for a far smaller alliance, now threatens to render NATO impotent in the face of 21st-century threats. A radical solution may be the only path forward. A shift to majority voting for key decisions could break the logjam and allow NATO to act with the necessary decisiveness. A revitalized NATO, capable of swiftly invoking Article 5 in a crisis, is essential to deterring potential aggressors and safeguarding the security of its member states.
A "burden-sharing" conversation shouldn't be framed as anti-European. European allies should signal their commitment to collective defense in Europe. This doesn't diminish the value of the U.S.' role, but it acknowledges that in the long term, a healthy NATO requires a more self-reliant Europe—and we are far away from that point. In Washington, there should be a recognition of the inherent limitations of a one-size-fits-all alliance stretched across every global conflict. The U.S. needs to understand that NATO can't be Washington's tool for every challenge, from the War on Terror to China. More importantly, with an enlarged NATO facing a potentially emboldened Russia in Ukraine, a consensus-based decision-making process may not be the right fit for this critical moment for European security.
Mohammed Soliman is a director at the Middle East Institute, a member of McLarty Associates, and a visiting fellow at Third Way. On X: @ThisIsSoliman
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
