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In recent years, the concept of "containment" has made a surprising comeback in U.S. foreign policy circles, with strategists proposing a "New Containment" strategy aimed at Russia and China. This idea, modeled after America's Cold War strategy, seeks to create a cordon sanitaire around these nations, using economic and military measures to limit their influence.
This approach, however, is fundamentally flawed, and risks not only failure but an exacerbation of global tensions. Indeed, as scholars Nicolai N. Petro and Arta Moeini argue, the current trajectory of the Russo-Ukrainian War highlights the dangers of underestimating Russia's willingness to defend its perceived vital interests, even at great cost to itself.
The original containment strategy, as conceived by George Kennan, was tailored to the unique geopolitical context of the Cold War. It aimed to limit Soviet expansion through a combination of military deterrence and economic incentives, focusing on areas of strategic importance while avoiding direct conflict. Kennan's approach was nuanced, recognizing the limitations of military power and emphasizing the need for political and ideological engagement.
Today's proponents of New Containment, by contrast, seem to have misunderstood the original doctrine's subtleties. They advocate for a blanket strategy that targets both Russia and China simultaneously, without considering the distinct challenges each country presents or the vastly different global context we now inhabit.
Consider the economic realm. New Containment relies heavily on economic isolation as a tool of coercion, as in the case of the recent spate of sanctions deployed against Russia. During the Cold War, elements of this approach made sense: the West enjoyed a near-monopoly on advanced technologies and economic resources, which it used to incentivize allies and deter adversaries.
Today, however, the global economic landscape has changed dramatically. Unlike the Soviet Union, modern Russia and China are deeply integrated into the global economy. China, in particular, has emerged as a manufacturing powerhouse, deeply integrated into global supply chains. A strategy of economic isolation is therefore far less feasible and potentially much more self-damaging for the U.S. This can be seen in current attempts to "re-shore" manufacturing from China: supply chains are being lengthened while retaining the same starting and endpoints. Products are still coming from China, but are either transported through or going through the final stages of assembly in an intermediary country to give the appearance that they are delinked from China.
Other kinds of sanctions and trade barriers, while certainly disruptive and even costly, are unlikely to achieve the desired effect of crippling these nations' economies. For one, they can simply experience the same process of supply chain lengthening described above. Consider that, over the past two years, Serbia's exports to Kyrgyzstan have gone up by 6,200 percent. As one economist notes, "There's no doubt that Kyrgyzstan is a key node in transshipment of Western goods to Russia." More broadly, continually sanctioning Russia and China—and anyone who might be taking advantage of the current opportunity, as Kyrgyzstan is—risks pushing these countries closer together, accelerating the development of alternative economic networks such as the BRICS+ grouping, which seeks to create a parallel global economy less dependent on Western institutions and currencies.
Beyond the realm of trade and finance, however, there is the more concerning possibility of military confrontation. One of the key flaws of the New Containment strategy is its failure to account for the principle of "escalation dominance" in regions adjacent to Russia and China. During the Cold War, the United States carefully avoided direct military engagements with the Soviet Union in areas deemed vital to Soviet security. If it had not, Moscow would have deemed it a major threat, easily precipitating a nuclear war. Today, however, the West is attempting to project power into areas where Russia and China have significant military advantages, such as Ukraine and the South China Sea.
This aggressive posture increases the risk of direct conflict, with potentially catastrophic consequences. A miscalculation in the Indo-Pacific could provoke a dangerous escalation with China, whose military capabilities and regional influence have grown significantly.
Such a miscalculation could also come about for ideological reasons. The ideological aspect of containment during the Cold War played a crucial role in its success. Kennan's strategy envisioned a future where the Soviet Union could eventually reintegrate into the global community once communism collapsed. This hopeful vision offered an alternative to Soviet citizens, fostering its eventual transformation.
In contrast, the New Containment strategy lacks a positive vision for Russia or China. It portrays these nations not just as strategic competitors but as existential threats that must be defeated and isolated indefinitely—if not dismantled. This approach alienates Russian and Chinese leaders, entrenches nationalist sentiments, and makes diplomacy—let alone future détente—more difficult.
New Containment is thus not only a flawed approach, but a misapplication of Cold War logic to a fundamentally different global context. It risks escalating conflicts, damaging the U.S. and global economies, and alienating potential allies. Instead of clinging to dated, aggressive, and unsound strategies, the United States should adopt a more nuanced approach, drawing on the principles of Washingtonian Realism. This philosophy—which advocates for a foreign policy that prioritizes national unity, economic self-sufficiency, and pragmatic diplomacy—emphasizes the importance of engaging with the world in a way that aligns with America's core interests and values. It recognizes the need for strategic partnerships based on mutual respect and shared goals, rather than coercive tactics and unilateral demands that are unlikely to work.
By fostering dialogue, cooperation, and mutual respect, the United States can build a more stable and prosperous international order—one that reflects the complexities of the 21st century rather than the binaries of the Cold War. This approach offers a more hopeful vision for the future that aligns with America's enduring principles, and its role as a global leader.
Carlos Roa is an Associate Washington Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy and a Visiting Fellow at the Danube Institute. He is the former executive editor of The National Interest and remains a contributing editor of that publication.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
