🎙️ Voice is AI-generated. Inconsistencies may occur.
For the first 14 months of Vladimir Putin's war in Ukraine, residents of Moscow saw very few everyday reminders that their country was fighting on foreign soil. True, foreign brands including McDonald's and IKEA had closed up shop in Russia during the early weeks of Vladimir Putin's so-called "special military operation," but at least in the capital, authorities seemed to be trying to preserve an atmosphere of normalcy.
Now, however, just as Ukrainian forces gear up for a long-awaited counteroffensive, a ubiquitous new marketing campaign purportedly aimed at persuading locals to volunteer for military service has covered Moscow's shawarma kiosks, liquor store windows and bus stops with posters featuring Russian soldiers who are notably better equipped than most who are actually doing the fighting on the front lines.
Fliers handed out on pedestrian streets and in shopping centers offer qualified enlistees a signing bonus of 195,000 rubles ($2,384) and, depending on experience, salaries ranging from 210,000-340,000 rubles ($2,567-$4,156) for each month spent in the "zone of the special military operation."
According to the Russian Federal Statistics Service, Rosstat, the national median monthly income in November 2022 was 63,060 rubles ($770), with the corresponding figure in Moscow reaching 113,722 rubles ($1,390). But despite the relatively lucrative offers for soldiers possessing the necessary skills and experience, on-the-ground observers do not expect to see masses of their neighbors rushing to volunteer.
"Muscovites act as if they do not even see the advertisements," a prominent Moscow-based political analyst, who asked not to be named for fear of retribution from the local authorities, told Newsweek. "In another beloved tradition of the Soviet period, they retreat into their own personal lives and do their best to avoid noticing anything unpleasant which is happening around them."
"Even I have friends who say that, if the Motherland calls, they will serve," he added. "But none of them are joining up voluntarily, and a campaign like this one won't convince them to. If they haven't taken their first ten chances to become soldiers in Putin's army, they are unlikely to take this one, either."
Muscovites' lack of enthusiasm for their country's war of aggression stands in stark contrast to the attitudes of Ukrainians, even of relatively well-to-do Kyivans, who remain almost uniformly committed to their nation's self-defense. In an op-ed titled "Stop Victim-Blaming Russian Refugees," which was published on April 25 in The Moscow Times, Russian citizen and University of Chicago professor of economics Konstantin Sonin noted the dichotomy:
"When I was in Kyiv last month, every person I spoke to—and I spoke to dozens—had friends or relatives who volunteered to fight in 2022. Many had gone to funerals for loved ones killed in the war," he wrote. "In contrast, not one Russian—either abroad or in Moscow—with whom I have spoken over the last year has had a loved one die in Ukraine. And my social circles in Kyiv and Moscow are basically the same—academics, students, journalists, intellectuals and businesspeople."
Despite the high level of commitment in Ukrainian society, however, Sonin's story also serves as a testament to the physical toll that the war has taken on Ukraine's significantly smaller population. Recently leaked Pentagon documents contemporaneous to the late winter of 2023 estimated that Russia, with a prewar population of over 140 million, had thus far sustained casualties in the range of "35.5K-43K" killed in action and "154K-180K" wounded.
While Ukraine's losses of "15.5K-17.5K" killed and "109K-113.5K" wounded were significantly smaller in absolute terms, they had been suffered by a pre-war population of just over 40 million, approximately 8 million of whom have fled abroad since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion.
In this context, even if the current Russian marketing campaign achieves relatively modest results, the quantity of manpower generated, even in Moscow, might prove to be something more than negligible.
We assess that right now the Russians are conducting an effort to try to convince the spring 2022 class of conscripts, who finished their mandatory service on April 1, to sign up as fully fledged contract soldiers.
"Most native Muscovites will not be interested in military service, but because of the size of the capital, there are still thousands of people in the city who might be," Mikhail Sinelnikov-Orishak, a Moscow-based publicist, told Newsweek.
"People come here from the provinces for employment opportunities," he explained. "And for those who don't find work, or for those who are cheated by employers who refuse to pay them, the prospect of contract service could be attractive."
Analysts outside Russia see another possible target for the advertising campaign: recently released conscripts transiting through Moscow on their way back home.
"We assess that right now the Russians are conducting an effort to try to convince the spring 2022 class of conscripts, who finished their mandatory service on April 1, to sign up as fully fledged contract soldiers," George Barros of the Institute for the Study of War told Newsweek.
Russia annually brings in up to 300,000 men for a mandatory one-year stint in the military, though most of their time in the ranks consists of training. Unlike the reservists who were mobilized in September 2022 following Ukraine's successful Kharkiv counteroffensive, very few members of the 2022 conscript class were ever sent to Ukraine, let alone into trenches on the front lines. Still, their recent familiarity with military affairs means that they are already relatively well-prepared for more serious duties.
"Recent conscripts are the ideal candidates to become contract soldiers because they've just undergone training," Barros said. "They can transition right over to the conventional Russian military fairly seamlessly."
The idea that the recruitment drive is aimed mainly at the roughly 134,000 conscripts who recently completed their mandatory service also fits with Russia's manpower generation schedule.
"With regards to Russian manpower, the spring 2023 conscripts are now coming in, and the Russians physically do not have the administrative capacity to conduct their regular conscription cycle while also doing a separate mobilization," Barros explained. "The force generation organs, the training grounds, the trainers, and the Ministry of Defense bureaucracy have limited bandwidth."
"We're unlikely to see significant Russian mobilization efforts from among its reservists for at least the next two to three months," he added.
Figures close to the Kremlin largely confirm the assessment of Barros and his ISW colleagues. Despite the public advertising effort that, at the very least, has compelled some of Russia's most privileged remaining residents to recall the fact that their country is indeed at war, Russian military analyst Vladislav Shurygin insists that his country's armed forces are not suffering from a manpower shortage.
"There is no mobilization on the horizon," Shurgin told Newsweek. "We've overcome the manpower crisis of last September-October and now have a reserve of 300,000."
"There is also a campaign in operation nationwide to bring 240,000 new contract soldiers into the army," he added. "Everything is going to plan."
