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Disinformation, deception, propaganda, manipulation, psychological operations: all these means are used by the Kremlin in pursuit of specific strategic and political goals both domestically and in the international arena. Russian actions conducted in the information space are never a coincidence. They are deliberate, well-planned, state-sanctioned, and they engage the entire state apparatus, including media platforms, propagandists, diplomacy, top officials, special services, and agents of influence.
In particular, Russian special services are deeply involved in planning and conducting information operations: the Kremlin's Federal Security Service stands behind disinformation and cyberattacks; military intelligence conducts kinetic activities related to so-called hybrid warfare and civilian intelligence; foreign intelligence conducts information operations against the West.
It seems that what had always been the modus operandi of the Soviet state, and then Russian Federation, has been forgotten or underestimated in Europe. But now, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, accompanied by intense information warfare waged against the whole West, has clearly showed that for Russia, the information space is a battlefield and information operations are a weapon. Russian aggression showed the importance of strategic communication and information space security, which has proved to be no less significant than conventional methods of waging war.
In Poland—due to our analysis of the current situation but also our historical and geopolitical background—we understand very well the threats coming from the East, and we are aware that they may have far-reaching consequences. Successful disinformation operations can provoke social tensions and fears, influence political decisions, slander particular governments or politicians, undermine the position of a chosen state in the international arena, or weaken bilateral relations or alliances.
Facing such threats as information and psychological operations, disinformation, manipulations, and simply lies, we must establish proper countermeasures in order to effectively combat threats in our information space. It is crucial to better coordinate our actions against disinformation and to increase social awareness.
That's why in Poland, on an everyday basis, we monitor the information space, identify hostile interference and information operations, assess potential risks and threats, and communicate with media—all in order to inform people about possible dangers and build the resilience of our society. Social awareness is one of the best countermeasures against all kinds of hostile actions in the information space. If we want to increase social resilience to disinformation, apart from monitoring the information space, we also have to educate our societies about possible threats and promote good practices of critical thinking and fact checking. If state institutions know how to react to information threats and people are aware of misleading narratives and understand the mechanisms of disinformation, they don't get deceived and they can't be manipulated. Disinformation won't work.
It is also very important that we—as states, governments, public institutions, or international organizations—conduct strategic communication in advance, be "the first" to deliver content about particular facts or events. If we are first to inform the public about something, then disinformation won't be so easily absorbed by public opinion.
Although Polish society is rather resistant to the Russian propaganda, since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine we've identified many hostile and dangerous narratives targeted against Poland, Polish-Ukrainian relations, and NATO and the entire Western community. The Russian repertoire of lies, manipulations, and provocations contains numerous narratives that aim to provoke fear of nuclear disaster, energy crises, or food shortages; polarize Polish and Ukrainian societies and bilateral relations; destroy NATO's unity and undermine confidence in the Alliance; slander countries that firmly support Ukraine; and question our military, financial, and humanitarian support for Ukraine.
What we observe in Poland is that Russian propaganda attempts to export narratives that serve to destroy Poland's reputation and reliability. False narratives imply, for example, that Poland wants to seize Western Ukraine or that Poland is making hostile plans against Belarus. Russian disinformation actions focus also on current events. Recently we have experienced increased propaganda efforts related to the latest incident at the Polish-Ukrainian border, in the village of Przewodowo, where an explosion caused by a Ukrainian air defense missile took place. Immediately Russian narratives started to claim that Ukraine poses a threat to Poland, that the West's support for Kyiv is a failure, and that it is Ukrainian missiles that destroy Ukrainian towns and cause casualties.
While identifying and analyzing disinformative content, we must maintain a broader perspective of Russia's actions and establish their fundamental strategic aim. Today, based on our assessments, we can state with confidence that Russia has not given up its maximalist objective, which is to seize all of Ukraine's territory and destroy Ukrainian statehood. Massive systematic air strikes, destruction of critical infrastructure, provoking humanitarian disaster: these actions by the Russian army prove that the Kremlin is not looking for any negotiations or peace. Its conventional military actions are complemented by hybrid operations, also conducted in the information space.
With all its information efforts aimed at destabilizing the situation in the West, the Kremlin wants to achieve one basic goal: make the West abandon Ukraine, which would be a turning point in the war. Putin knows that once left alone, Ukraine will not be able to defend its freedom and will be defeated. And then the security situation in our part of the world will become really dangerous.
That's why the West must understand that providing support for Ukraine, especially by delivering military equipment, is in our own best security interest. This is the only way to stop further Russian aggression. If we fail now, there will be no lasting peace in Europe—and who knows who Russia's next victim will be.
Stanisław Żaryn is Government Plenipotentiary for Security of the Information Space of the Republic of Poland.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
