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The Labour Party achieved a landslide victory in the U.K.'s 2024 general election. It secured 412 seats, resulting in a majority of 174 seats—meaning Labour won 63 percent of the seats on 34 percent of the popular vote. But despite the party's electoral triumph and promises of national renewal, Britain is changing. These changes have been exacerbated over the last decade due to a confluence of factors: Brexit, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the changing political, economic, and strategic trajectory of Washington. The structural underpinnings of British power have been significantly altered, putting at risk Prime Minister Keir Starmer's ambitious promises of renewal, which may quickly prove hollow.
Over the past several decades, the U.K. has faced significant challenges that have eroded its economic standing. Deindustrialization has led to a dramatic decline in its domestic manufacturing industries. Manufacturing's share in the U.K. economy plummeted from over 25 percent in 1990 to less than 10 percent in 2020, resulting in widespread job losses and regional disparities within Britain.
The 2008 financial crisis further exposed vulnerabilities in the British economy, particularly its reliance on service industries and the relative weakness of its manufacturing base. While the service sector has grown in recent decades, it is more susceptible to economic downturns than manufacturing is. This vulnerability necessitated austerity measures, which involved reductions in public investment and social programs. Leaving the European Union, the world's largest trading bloc, has undoubtedly exacerbated London's economic challenges, causing disruptions in trade, labor shortages, and a decline in foreign direct investment.
Despite these economic realities, London acts as if it is Washington, clinging to imperial nostalgia that no longer holds true. While London may be comparable to major metropolitan cities like Chicago or Los Angeles, Britain is not the United States. The U.K.'s nominal GDP, $3.5 trillion in 2024, falls far short of the United States' $28.78 trillion. Similarly, the U.S. population of approximately 336 million dwarfs the U.K.'s population of around 67 million. Furthermore, the rise of Asian economies has shifted the global economic balance, further diminishing the relative influence that London retained after its colonial era.
A confluence of domestic and external challenges—economic stagnation, political uncertainty, a shifting global order marked by a declining Europe, and a U.S. pivot to Asia—has significantly impacted Britain's foreign and defense policy. As "Global Britain" fails to materialize, London, consumed by internal political wrangling, finds itself incapable of securing trade deals with India, Canada, and multiple Gulf countries, and even excluded from the emerging India-Middle East-Europe Corridor announced at the G20 summit in Delhi. By contrast, Brussels, Berlin, Rome, and Paris are aligning their actions with Europe's interests and working in tandem with Washington to shape emerging trends around the Eurasian rimland.
This strategic stagnation reflects the reality that, in the 21st century, the U.K. is slowly but steadily becoming the backwaters of Europe. Europe, in turn, is gradually becoming the backwaters of the Asian rimland and is no longer the center of the universe. Therefore, the U.K. should have a sense of realism about its commitments and foreign policy priorities. More importantly, the U.S.-U.K. special relationship should be grounded in realpolitik rather than unsustainable expectations.
It is commendable that the new Labour defense secretary is clearheaded about the U.K.'s standing and priorities. John Healey, even before formally assuming his role, emphasized that his country's focus should be on the Atlantic rather than the Indo-Pacific as "Ukraine reminds [Britons] that our first obligations and our most acute threats lie in Europe." Healey emphasized that Britain's defense priorities are centered around Europe and the North Atlantic.
This vision for British defense might necessitate difficult conversations with Washington, which is currently urging allies to shift their focus toward the Indo-Pacific. But merging the Indo-Pacific and Europe into one global geopolitical theater is unwise, as it obscures strategic priorities for our allies in Europe, impairing their ability to effectively allocate resources for European defense in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Fortunately, Britain's new strategic posture fortuitously aligns with Washington's call for NATO allies to share the burden of their defense, thereby freeing up critical U.S. resources for the Indo-Pacific challenge. And, of course, London deserves credit for other strategic initiatives that are highly important to the U.K. as well as the U.S. These include the AUKUS pact with the U.S. and Australia, which will provide Canberra with nuclear-powered submarines, and a fifth-generation fighter jet project with Italy and Japan.
Promises of great renewal for the British nation make for excellent electoral politics. But the U.K.—like Europe in general—faces inherent economic, demographic, and military limitations. These limitations must be addressed realistically, not through expressions of lofty ideals or wishful thinking. Starmer will have to lead Britain as it is, not as it should be or as anyone wishes it to be.
To move forward, the U.K. must embrace a realistic assessment of its global position by prioritizing its commitments within Europe and the North Atlantic. This British posture aligns with Washington's pivot to Asia, as competition with China will define the 21st century. Regardless of the outcome of the November elections in the U.S., Washington should assist the new Labour government in rebuilding its relationship with Europe and negotiating a post-Brexit defense pact that anchors Britain in European security. The U.K.'s military support for Ukraine against Russia underscores its critical role in European security—a role that will become all the more important as Washington looks to the Indo-Pacific.
Mohammed Soliman is a director at the Middle East Institute, a member of McLarty Associates, and a visiting fellow at Third Way. On X: @ThisIsSoliman
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
