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Russian President Vladimir Putin has frequently claimed that the West is seeking the breakup of Russia. Even for those Russians who are squeamish about Putin's war in Ukraine, this is a powerful rationale for continuing the war. For as bad as the war in Ukraine has been for the Russians who have been killed or wounded in the fighting or suffer as a result of Western economic sanctions, the breakup of Russia would be worse. Better for Russians, according to this logic, to fight the Western-backed Ukrainians in Ukraine than to fight them and one another inside Russia itself.
During the short-lived Wagner Group mutiny in June, its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin made a statement saying Ukraine did not actually threaten Russia, and that it was Russia's "greedy generals" who falsely claimed it did. Had Putin taken up this line, it would have been a way to blame the war on someone else and allow him (and Prigozhin) to end it. Putin, of course, is so invested in the war that he is neither willing nor able to do this, and so the war continues. But the demonstrated popularity of Prigozhin and his outspokenness combined with the lack of opposition to his mutiny from the regular Russian security forces suggests that his negative view of the war in Ukraine resonates more widely among Russians. If only they could become convinced that the West is not really seeking the breakup of Russia.
Whether or not Putin really believes this is the West's aim, he has no incentive to say otherwise since this would undermine the entire rationale for his war against Ukraine. So long as Putin remains in power, he will continue his war against Ukraine and his hostility toward America and the West. But Putin won't remain in power. And as the lack of opposition to the Wagner mutiny showed, the possibility of his being ousted is real. But those who could oust him will not do so if they think that the West will see this as the moment to engineer what Putin has warned against: the breakup of Russia. The West, then, must somehow signal to Putin's potential successors (and we don't know exactly who these might be) that this is not its aim.
But if the idea that the West is not a threat to Russia has any chance of taking hold within Russia (and most especially within the security forces that could oust Putin), the United States, other Western governments, and even Ukraine are going to have to articulate a vision of a future Russia that they would like to see which is not just acceptable, but even appealing to Russians.
A highly positive image of a future Russia which Western governments could endorse has already been articulated by the jailed Putin opponent Alexei Navalny: "the beautiful Russia of the future" that is free, democratic, at peace with its neighbors and the West. One of Putin's core beliefs is that the democratic "color revolutions" (whether successful or not) were really U.S.-led efforts to oust regimes friendly to Moscow and replace them with ones supporting Washington. In Putin's worldview, democracy (or just a holding out of the false expectation of democracy) equals subordination to America and the West.
The U.S. and other Western governments need, then, to convey to the Russian public and security forces that while we would like to see democracy flourish in Russia, we have no expectation that a democratic Russia would join the EU or NATO. While Western governments would welcome cooperation with Russia through both organizations, Western governments should make clear that they would very much be willing to work with a democratic Russia that resembles India, Brazil, Indonesia, or South Africa. These countries are democratic (for the most part), not formally allied with America and the West but pursue their own independent foreign policies, cooperating with the West in areas of common interest. But in truth, the West does not even require Russia to become democratic. An autocratic Russia that is "at peace with its neighbors and the West" would undoubtedly be good enough for us.
But to bring about a peaceable Russia (whether democratic or autocratic), Western governments need to signal both what they want from and are willing to provide Russia in return. At minimum, the West expects Russia to end to its war on Ukraine and to withdraw its forces from occupied Ukrainian territory. In response, the West should end its Ukraine-war related economic sanctions on Russia and resume trade with it. Post-war Russia should make reparations to Ukraine for all the damage that Putin has caused. But there should also be Western economic support for a post-Putin Russia that behaves with restraint toward Ukraine and its other neighbors. Above all, Western governments should make clear that just as they support the restoration of Ukrainian territorial integrity, they also support the preservation of Russia's.
Can such messaging from the West really help usher in "the beautiful Russia of the future?" As many will quickly point out, there is no guarantee that it will. The absence of such messaging, though, may ensure that this does not come about. For even if there are those in the security services or the oligarch class—like Prigozhin—who recognize that continuing the war in Ukraine is not in Russia's interests, they are more likely to stand by Putin—or someone like him—if they fear that the alternative will be worse both for Russia and for them. The West needs to signal to Putin's potential successors that if Russia is willing to be at peace with its neighbors, the West is willing to be at peace with Russia.
Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
