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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin both spent part of Dec. 20 handing out medals and giving pep-talks about a war that crossed its 300th day this week. But the pictures couldn't have been any more different. Zelensky, unshaven and donning a green camouflage sweatshirt, jetted to the most active front in the war to commensurate with his troops and thank them for holding the line in the face of a six-month Russian offensive. Putin, dressed in his formal black suit and red tie, was in the comfort of the Kremlin, acknowledging that the fight has been far more difficult than he expected.
With the exception of Bakhmut, a medium-sized town of 70,000 people that is all but gutted of any life save those who can't afford to leave (or won't), the war for the moment has settled into what looks like a stalemate. There is still plenty of shooting and bombing going on, of course. Russian forces continue to throw massive amounts of ordinance at Ukraine's energy facilities in an attempt to cut off heat and power to millions of Ukrainian civilians bearing the frigid winter cold. Under the command of General Sergey Surovikin, the Russian army is solidifying its defensive lines, implementing a war-time strategy of collective punishment against the Ukrainians and using the winter months to rebuild some of its strength after an especially brutal 10 months.
For the Ukrainians, the name of the game is composure and preparation. Wars have many twists and turns. The side currently on the offensive can find itself ceding ground weeks or months later. Despite the bombastic, patriotic fervor of Zelensky and his team as well as the military victories in the field since the summer, Ukraine's generals are noticeably cognizant of the risks of over-celebrating. Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine's top military officer, is convinced Putin will execute another large-scale offensive by March at the very latest. "The Russians are preparing some 200,000 fresh troops," Zaluzhny told The Economist in an exclusive interview. "I have no doubt they will have another go at Kyiv." In the same publication, Oleksandr Syrsky, the commander of Ukraine's ground forces, mentioned that Russian tactics are less clumsy under Surovikin's command and that anyone writing Russia off as a spent force is kidding themselves.
Ukraine has the motivation and will on its side. Unlike the Russians, the Ukrainians are fighting for the very survival of their state—the same state Putin simply doesn't recognize as legitimate. While the Russian military may be a mix of discombobulated, demoralized men, Putin still believes he can transform his "special military operation" into a success. Casualties and retreats aside, Putin, surrounded by a small circle of sycophants terrified of giving him bad news, has never wavered in a war he can't afford to lose given what defeat would mean for his staying power (the Russian political and economic elite is growing more divided as the war goes on). He's open to diplomacy with Kyiv, but only on his terms—and those terms, including a formal recognition of his annexation of eastern and southern Ukraine, isn't something Zelensky or any other Ukrainian president is willing to contemplate for a moment. Putin's trip this week to Belarus suggests the possibility that the Russians could use Belarusian territory to open up another front in the north, stretching out the Ukrainians at a time when much of Russia's combat power is located in the Donbas.
Zelensky isn't about to concede either. With so many victories under the Ukrainian army's belt, he likely believes Russia can be defeated militarily. Zelensky's 10-point piece plan is less a peace plan than a call for Russia to surrender, withdraw from every square inch of Ukrainian territory (including Crimea) and beg for Ukraine's forgiveness. Zelensky wouldn't be presenting such strong terms if he didn't believe the West, most crucially the United States, would be in his corner for the long haul.
The Biden administration has done a fairly good job thus far of balancing two twin objectives: giving Ukraine the military equipment it needs to defend itself and minimizing any escalation between Russia and U.S.-led NATO. The White House has refused to send Ukraine some of the long-range missile systems it could use to launch attacks directly into Russia (as shown most recently on Dec. 5, the Ukrainians are capable of striking deep into Russia when they want to) and reportedly discouraged Kyiv from killing Russia's top general when his location was discovered. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin are keeping channels of communication open with their Russian counterparts, even if agreement on most topics is illusory.
Yet at the same time, U.S. policy is also working against itself. Everybody up to President Joe Biden pledges continued military and financial support to Ukraine for as long as it takes (the U.S. Congress not only appropriated an additional $45 billion for Ukraine in the draft spending bill, but is preparing to host Zelensky for a joint session). Even so, the U.S. seems far more interested in ending the war through a diplomatic settlement than through a World War II-style surrender. At the same time, the U.S. remains extremely cautious in dictating any peace to Ukraine; U.S. officials up and down the chain of command and across the national security bureaucracy repeat the mantra that Ukraine, and only Ukraine, has the right to determine when or even if negotiations with Russia are appropriate. In short: "Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine."
Ukraine, however, isn't interested in a negotiation at this time. We should all get ready for renewed fighting into the new year.
Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune and Newsweek.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
